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Abstract
Background: Simulation models of influenza spread play an important role for pandemic preparedness. However,
as the world has not faced a severe pandemic for decades, except the rather mild H1N1 one in 2009, pandemic
influenza models are inherently hypothetical and validation is, thus, difficult. We aim at reconstructing a recent
seasonal influenza epidemic that occurred in Switzerland and deem this to be a promising validation strategy for
models of influenza spread.
Methods: We present a spatially explicit, individual-based simulation model of influenza spread. The simulation
model bases upon (i) simulated human travel data, (ii) data on human contact patterns and (iii) empirical
knowledge on the epidemiology of influenza. For model validation we compare the simulation outcomes with
empirical knowledge regarding (i) the shape of the epidemic curve, overall infection rate and reproduction
number, (ii) age-dependent infection rates and time of infection, (iii) spatial patterns.
Results: The simulation model is capable of reproducing the shape of the 2003/2004 H3N2 epidemic curve of
Switzerland and generates an overall infection rate (14.9 percent) and reproduction numbers (between 1.2 and 1.3),
which are realistic for seasonal influenza epidemics. Age and spatial patterns observed in empirical data are also
reflected by the model: Highest infection rates are in children between 5 and 14 and the disease spreads along
the main transport axes from west to east.
Conclusions: We show that finding evidence for the validity of simulation models of influenza spread by
challenging them with seasonal influenza outbreak data is possible and promising. Simulation models for
pandemic spread gain more credibility if they are able to reproduce seasonal influenza outbreaks. For more robust
modelling of seasonal influenza, serological data complementing sentinel information would be beneficial.
Background
Mathematical models and computer simulations of
influenza spread have become increasingly important for
pandemic preparedness within the last few years and
have influenced the decisions of public health authori-
ties [1,2]. A non-systematic search in the common pub-
lication databases identified plenty of studies modelling
the spread of (mostly pandemic) influenza outbreaks
[3-13]. However, models of pandemic spread are in
most cases hypothetical because they focus on future
pandemics [e.g. [6,7,10-13]] and, thus, are not validated
with empirical data. In contrast, some models of histori-
cal case examples explicitly address the model validation
issue [e.g. [5]], but they are of limited value for under-
standing nowadays pandemic threat as society has chan-
ged vastly. As there is no alternative to prospective,
hypothetical modelling for addressing scientifically
potential future problems, new strategies for model vali-
dation are needed.
By validation we understand confirming that a certain
model provides a good reproduction of the real-world
behaviour we are trying to simulate [14]. In agreement
with the prevailing view in philosophy of science, we see
model validation as a rather non-algorithmic, but argu-
mentative process [15,16]: Achieving a good statistical
fit between a simulated and an empirical epidemic curve
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Instead, it has to be agreed upon which aspects of reality
shall be reproduced and what reproduction exactly
means.
The more real world data sets can be reproduced with
a certain model or the more known characteristics can
be reproduced with a model, the more reason we have
to believe that the model is valid. Inherently, models
forecasting future events cannot be checked against
empirical data, but applying such a model successfully
to past events provides some certainty that the model is
valid per se and can be used for the comparative assess-
ment of different scenarios including interventions.
This validation strategy has successfully been applied
in various fields, such as climate research [17] or disease
spread, where Carpenter and Sattenspiel [5] recon-
structed meticulously the characteristics of the 1918
influenza outbreak in an indigenous Canadian commu-
nity by means of an individual-based model. The pro-
blem when influenza pandemic models are challenged
with data about past pandemics is that the last pan-
demics date back so far that they are only of limited
v a l u ea sm o b i l i t yp a t t e r n sa n dc o n t a c ts t r u c t u r e sc h a n -
ged vastly.
An alternative approach is to challenge simulation
models with data from seasonal influenza outbreaks.
Seasonal influenza outbreaks feature some particulari-
ties, which increase the system complexity and make
them quite often resistant against attempts to reproduce
them successfully in simulation models: Most pandemic
models assume that there is no pre-existing host immu-
nity due to the novelty of a pandemic strain [e.g.
[8-10]], but in the case of seasonal influenza this cannot
be ignored. Further, seasonal influenza epidemics are
often characterized by several co-existent strains, which
have to be treated as distinct diseases but which can
interact in complex manner at the same time. Neverthe-
less, challenging models with seasonal influenza data is
a promising validation strategy, because for seasonal
influenza we have topical data.
In this paper, we present and describe a spatially
explicit, individual-based model of influenza spread in
Switzerland. We chose an individual-based approach
because this allows us to include spatial and social het-
erogeneities - important factors for understanding pat-
terns of disease - easily. The model makes use of
disaggregated human travel data of whole Switzerland
generated by the open source transport simulation soft-
ware MATSim [18]. We further select data from the
2003/2004 H3N2 influenza epidemic in Switzerland and
delineate why it is a good example for reconstruction
and model validation. Our aim is to show that the simu-
lation outcome is consistent with measured data and
empirically based knowledge about the following aspects
of seasonal influenza:
1.) Epidemic curve, overall infection rate and repro-
duction number
2.) Age-dependent infection rates and time of
infection
3.) Spatial patterns of influenza spread.
Methods
In this section, we first substantiate why we chose to
model the 2003/2004 H3N2 influenza epidemic for
model validation. We then describe the available data
on this epidemic in Switzerland. Finally, we present all
social and biological processes and assumptions which
constitute our simulation model of influenza spread (see
also Additional File 1).
Choosing the influenza season to be reconstructed
Seasonal influenza epidemics are very complex in their
dynamics and their effective drivers. On top, there are
enormous uncertainties regarding the involved transmis-
sion processes, pre-existing host immunity, the propor-
tions of asymptomatic, mild, moderate and severe
courses of infection as well as the “true” infection rates.
For a successful reconstruction of a preceding epidemic,
a careful selection of the epidemic is highly important.
The epidemic should have certain properties that reduce
the complexity to a manageable level and that make it
well suited for model validation. We present three of
such properties subsequently.
1. Only one dominant influenza strain in the period of
interest. Quite often we see two or more strains circulat-
ing simultaneously in a population. Having more than
one strain at a time leads to an increase in system com-
plexity that cannot be tackled in a simulation model:
Two different strains must be modelled as two distinct
diseases, but usually existing sentinel data only monitors
on the basis of ILI symptoms and does not differentiate
by strain. Therefore, there is no data on spatial patterns
and age dependency of different strains. In Switzerland
from the eleven influenza seasons between 1995 and
2006 just three fulfilled the criterion of having a domi-
nant strain which is responsible for almost all analyzed
cases: 1997/1998; 1999/2000 and 2003/2004 (cf. Table 1).
2. Clear empirical spatial patterns can serve as one
indicator amongst others for the validity of a simulation
model. If there are observable spatial differences in the
course of an influenza epidemic, these differences can
be tried to be reproduced. If a simulation model repro-
duces observed spatial-temporal patterns (amongst other
characteristics), then this is a further cue that the struc-
tural decisions and model assumptions underlying the
simulation are appropriate. On the European continent,
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enza spread was observable [19]. Such a west-east trend
can also be observed in several years within Switzerland.
However, of all the years with a single dominant strain,
this west-east trend is most pronounced in the 2003/
2004 season.
3. Inflows of infected persons from outside the system
boundaries should not affect the internal spread
dynamics in a relevant manner. Every simulation model
has system boundaries - typically national borders. In
case of Switzerland there are between 167000 (2003)
and 213000 (2008) cross-border commuters [20], who
travel daily from Germany, France, Italy and Austria to
Switzerland and who are potentially an important source
of imported influenza infections. The condition that the
dynamics should be primarily internal is met by the
2003/2004 H3N2 epidemic. The epidemic took off in
the westernmost part of Switzerland around Geneva
during the 47th and 48th calendar weeks of 2003 (cf.
Figure 1) - preceded by the westernmost countries in
Europe (England, Scotland, Portugal and Spain peaked
already during the 45th and 46th calendar week) -,
where it probably was introduced from France [19,21].
Within Switzerland the epidemic moved towards the
east within the next few weeks with a nationwide peak
in the second week of 2004 (cf. Figures 1 and 2). Spatial
dynamics seen within Switzerland might be mainly gov-
erned by internal processes because the other two
neighbouring countries of Switzerland with a long com-
mon border, Germany and Italy, experienced only an
extremely mild and late influenza season. Germany had
much less excess physician consultations than in the
four preceding seasons and Baden-Württemberg (the
German federal state neighbouring Switzerland) peaked
in the 9th week of 2004 when the epidemic in Switzer-
land was almost over [21]; Italy as a whole peaked in
the 6th week [19].
Swiss influenza sentinel data
Approximately 3% (some 200; cf. Figure 2, orange line)
of the general practitioners participate voluntarily in the
Swiss sentinel system. They report the number of ILI
diagnoses and the total number of consultations in their
surgery on a weekly basis [22]. The nationwide inci-
dence of influenza cases leading to a consultation is cal-
culated by the Swiss Office of Public Health based on
this sentinel data and the nationwide number of consul-
tations known from the health insurance companies.
The extrapolated number of consultations due to influ-
enza for the 2003/2004 H3N2 epidemic in Switzerland
is shown in Figure 2 (dark grey bars).
The Swiss influenza sentinel data further allow coarse
spatial analyses as every reported case is linked to a con-
crete practitioner and as for every practitioner it is
known to which municipality she or he belongs.
Transmission pathways of influenza and contact
definition
Known transmission pathways for human influenza
viruses include direct physical contact, indirect physical
contact, direct transmission via large droplets or indir-
ectly by aerosols. No consensus has been achieved about
the relative importance of these pathways under natural
conditions. Some deem aerosols an important path
[23-25] while others emphasize that close interaction is
usually needed for transmission [26,27]. For example,
a past influenza outbreak on an airplane was best
explained with aerosol transmission [28], whereas a
recent H1N1 outbreak appeared to be caused solely by
close, direct conversation [29]. It is also possible that
the relative importance of the pathways depends on cli-
matic conditions and virus strain specific characteristics.
The decision on which pathway of transmission a
model should be based, has far-reaching implications for
the modelling strategy: aerosol transmission would be
Table 1 Frequency of different influenza strains in analyzed Swiss samples
Season A H1N1 A H1N2 A H3N2 B Total
Cases proportion cases proportion cases proportion cases proportion
1995/96 146 51% 0% 109 38% 30 11% 285
1996/97 2 1% 0% 234 68% 109 32% 345
1997/98 5 2% 0% 321 98% 0% 326
1998/99 0% 0% 83 37% 143 63% 226
1999/00 0% 0% 115 100% 0% 115
2000/01 110 89% 0% 1 1% 13 10% 124
2001/02 0% 1 0% 103 44% 130 56% 234
2002/03 1 1% 5 3% 125 68% 52 28% 183
2003/04 1 0% 0% 225 99% 2 1% 228
2004/05 35 12% 0% 225 75% 41 14% 301
2005/06 9 4% 0% 13 6% 183 89% 205
The data has kindly been provided by the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health.
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Page 3 of 18Figure 1 Reported cases of seven Swiss cities and their hinterland. The figure shows the reported cases of (i) seven Swiss cities (black bars);
(ii) municipalities, whose centre is in a range of 7.5 km from the centre of the respective city (dark grey bars); (iii) municipalities with a centre in
the range of 15 km (light grey bars)
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duals contaminate places; cf. [30]) and the transmission
risk depends vastly on ventilation conditions and less on
social interaction [31]. Transmission by large droplets
and physical contact are best described by dynamic one-
mode networks (individuals infect individuals directly,
cf. [30]); the related risk of infection can be estimated
based on intensity and duration of the respective contact
[32].
Here, we subscribe to the assumption that transmis-
sion via large droplets and close contact are the domi-
nant pathways of transmission and thus direct and close
interaction between individuals is a precondition for
infection in our model. Information on contact duration
and intensity is not included in the current version of
the model, instead all contacts weigh equally.
Spatio-social contact structure
Identifying sets of potential contact partners
Understanding and reproducing the spatial patterns of
human movements is the common interest of spatially
explicit epidemic models and transport simulation mod-
els. Hence, it is reasonable to link transport modelling
and epidemiological modelling in a synergistic way, as
has previously been done e.g. for smallpox spread in the
Portland region [33,34] or for respiratory diseases [35].
For identifying individuals that possibly have con-
tact with each other, we utilize a validated [36,37] open
source toolbox called MATSim [18], which was devel-
oped for implementing large-scale agent-based transport
simulations. Details on MATSim are given elsewhere
[18,38,39].
The wish or the need to perform certain activities is
the main driver for human movement [39]. Individuals
choose activities on different locations. That generates
traffic and potentially infectious contacts [38]. Sequences
of activities ("schedules”) are generated and equilibrated
in MATSim based on information about the characteris-
tics of every individual of the (synthetic) population, i.e.
their needs and preferences, and about the social and
built environment, e.g. opening hours, (cf. Table 2; the
use of the data sources presented in Table 2 was
approved by the responsible authorities) [38,39]. The
MATSim simulation process has three steps: (i) scenario
creation (establishing a synthetic population [39], the
transport network [40] and the set of locations with
their corresponding capacities and open times), (ii)
initial demand modelling (creating an initial schedule
for every individual based on given data [41]) and (iii)
demand equilibration (allowing individuals iteratively to
re-decide on their schedules for achieving more realistic
results) [39]. Compared to state-of-practice transport
modelling processes [42] MATSim comes up with an
integrated assignment and demand equilibration com-
pletely based on time-dynamic schedules for every
member of the synthetic population. These individual
schedules are saved in an XML-file (an excerpt of such
a file is shown in Figure 3) that can be used for further
analysis or as input data for other simulations - like in
the epidemic model presented in this paper.
Based on this information, we can identify individuals,
who share the same location and thus having a chance
to infect each other. In the current version of our model
we map all individuals on a geographic grid with a side
length of 500 by 500 meters. In principle, the set of
potential contact partners for each individual consists of
those people, who perform the same activity within the
same grid cell. However, for some activity categories, we
Figure 2 Epidemic curves and reporting practitioners. The dark grey bars show the extrapolated reported cases coming from the Swiss
sentinel system. The light grey bars show the average simulated number of cases. The whiskers represent the standard deviation. The orange
line stands for the number of reporting practitioners during the course of time.
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Table 3):
Home contacts We assume that every individual has
daily contact with every other individual who lives in
the same household. Information on the exact house-
hold compositions is taken from the Swiss census (cf.
Table 2). Contacts at home beyond the regular cohabi-
tants are not included in the simulation model.
Work contacts All individuals who work within a cer-
tain grid cell are allocated to work groups. The targeted
work group sizes are assumed to follow a normal distri-
bution with a mean of ten work group members and a
standard deviation of two (values rounded to the nearest
integer value; see also Additional File 1). Every indivi-
dual can only belong to one work group per grid cell. If
there are not enough individuals in a grid cell to form a
workgroup of the targeted size, they form a workgroup
of the maximally possible size. All individuals within the
s a m ew o r kg r o u pa sw e l la st h ew h o l es e to fw o r k i n g
individuals within the same grid cell are eligible as
<person id="1020708" sex="m" age="57" license="yes" car_avail="always" employed="yes">
...                                                                                    
<plan score="164.3011341159086" selected="yes">
<act type="home" link="119428" facility="133427" x="692210" y="286910"
start_time="00:00:00" dur="07:19:58" end_time="07:19:58" />
<leg mode="bike" dep_time="07:19:58" trav_time="00:15:13" arr_time="07:35:11">     
</leg>
<act type="work_sector3" link="110071" facility="10278517" x="689048" y="284557"
start_time="07:35:11" dur="02:32:59" end_time="10:08:10" />
<leg mode="bike" dep_time="10:08:10" trav_time="00:15:13" arr_time="10:23:23">     
</leg>
<act type="home" link="119428" facility="133427" x="692210" y="286910"
start_time="10:23:23" dur="00:51:05" end_time="11:14:28" />
<leg mode="bike" dep_time="11:14:28" trav_time="00:15:13" arr_time="11:29:41">     
</leg>                                                                             
<act type="work_sector3" link="110071" facility="10278517" x="689048" y="284557"
start_time="11:29:41" dur="07:05:25" end_time="18:35:06" />                      
<leg mode="bike" dep_time="18:35:06" trav_time="00:13:58" arr_time="18:49:04">     
</leg>
<act type="shop" link="110070" facility="10286070" x="692047" y="286350"
start_time="18:49:04" dur="00:54:59" end_time="19:44:03" />
<leg mode="bike" dep_time="19:44:03" trav_time="00:00:07" arr_time="19:44:10">     
</leg>
<act type="leisure" link="110070" facility="10286078" x="692022" y="286369"
start_time="19:44:10" dur="04:06:55" end_time="23:51:05" />
<leg mode="bike" dep_time="23:51:05" trav_time="00:01:46" arr_time="23:52:51">     
</leg>                                                                             
<act type="home" link="119428" facility="133427" x="692210" y="286910"
start_time="23:52:51" />                                                         
</plan>                                                                                
</person> 
Figure 3 MATSim output - Sequence of activities. This figure shows an excerpt of the XML data structure generated by MATSim. The
highlighted information is used in the here presented influenza model: id refers to an existing unique identifier in the Swiss census; age gives
the age in years of the respective agent; every activity has a type - we distinguish home, work, education, shop and leisure; x and y are
coordinates and refer to the Swiss military grid.
Table 2 Sources of information used for the Swiss MATSim scenario
Source Description and information used
Volkszählung 2000 The Swiss census is conducted once a decade and includes the entire legal resident population (~7.2 million in 2000). It links
inhabitants to concrete buildings and households and provides information about demographical characteristics, place(s) of
residence, place of work, etc.
Mikrozensus Verkehr
2005
The “Mikrozensus Verkehr” is a travel behaviour survey carried out by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office every five years. In
2005 a sample of 33390 inhabitants participated and answered questions about their mobility behaviour. In particular, they
filled in a travel and activity diary.
Betriebszählung 2000 The enterprise census ("Betriebszählung”) records data on all public or private enterprises in Switzerland. There are ~398000
workplaces in Switzerland and for all of them the exact location, the sector they belong to and the number of employees is
known.
Nationales
Netzmodell
The national transportation planning network consists of ~24000 nodes and 60000 links of the Swiss transportation grid.
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explained subsequently.
Educational contacts All individuals who perform any
kind of education activity within a certain grid cell are
allocated to classes. Based on the data published in the
education statistics of the canton Zurich [43], we
assume that 20 students form a school class (see Addi-
tional File 1). Up to an age of 18, only students of the
same age can form a class. Educational activities of
adults include everything from university to evening
classes. For these individuals, we also form classes of 20
- but these classes are not stratified by age. All indivi-
duals within the class as well as the whole set of indivi-
duals within the same grid cell performing education
activities are eligible as contact partners according to
the selection rules explained next.
Contacts during shopping or leisure time For both
categories shopping and leisure, we assume no further
structure: All individuals, who perform either shopping
or leisure activities within a certain spatial cell, are eligi-
ble as contact partners for another individual with the
respective activity within this cell.
Realizing contacts
Relying on the data from the Swiss MATSim scenario,
we were able to identify sets of potential contact part-
ners for every individual. However, people do not have
contact every day with all persons they could possible
have contact with: Students do not have contact with
the same classmates every day and employees have
meetings with different co-workers each day. Thus, only
a subset of the potential contact partners has to be cho-
sen every simulation time step as realized contacts.
To do so, we rely on age-dependent distributions of
potentially contagious contacts measured in ten Eur-
opean countries [44]. We calculate the mean number of
household contacts (all other household members) for
each age group and subtract it from the empirical
means [44], which results in the remaining average
number of contacts to be achieved during the daily non-
home activities. By calculating how many distinct activ-
ities are on average performed by the members of a cer-
tain age group, we can figure out how many contacts
have to be made in average per activity in order to
reach the contact number targets. We assume that the
contact distribution per activity and age group follows a
negative binomial distribution [44]. Details are given in
Table 4.
Based on the so-defined probability distributions, we
allocate a target number of contact partners to each dis-
tinct combination of a person performing a certain
activity at a certain location. The allocation is a random
process taking place newly at every simulation time step
and completely independent from former allocations. To
note, individuals, who perform many activities meet on
average more other people than individuals with only
few activities. With the Swiss MATSim scenario we
achieve in total an average number of contacts per day
of 12.4 (SD = 8.9; mode = 7), which is plausible [44].
The target numbers of contact partners allocated as
described are like stubs which have to be connected in
order to become contacts. We connect stubs on demand,
i.e. we look only for contact partners for those indivi-
duals, who are infectious. If all of a certain individual’s
stubs are connected to other individuals’ stubs, this indi-
vidual is no longer available as a contact partner.
In principle, contact partners are chosen from the set
of other individuals performing the same activity within
the same grid cell. In addition, for two out of four non-
home activities fixed subgroups have been defined:
Employees are allocated to work groups and students
are allocated to classes. We adopt the assumption of
Ferguson et al. and assume that with a probability of
0.75 the counterpart for an unconnected stub comes
from the work group or the class, respectively, whereas
the others are chosen from the total set on the grid cell
level (cf. p. 8 of the supplementary material of [8]). As
Table 3 Groups of potential contact partners
Activity
categories
Group definition
Home All individuals living in one household.
Work 1) Grid cell group: all individuals working within a grid cell
1.
2) Work group: all individuals working within one grid cell
1 are randomly assigned to work groups. The target group size
distribution is a normal distribution with a mean of 10 (SD = 2).
Education 1) Grid cell group: all individuals performing an educational activity within a grid cell
1.
2) Class A: all individuals aged 18 or younger within one grid cell
1 are assigned to classes. The target class size is 20 students and
classes are stratified by age.
3) Class B: all individuals older than 18 within one grid cell
1 are randomly assigned to classes. The target class size is 20 students.
There is no age stratification.
Shop All individuals shopping within a grid cell
1.
Leisure All individuals performing leisure activities within a grid cell
1 (not at home).
1The physical space is divided into grid cells of 500 by 500 meters.
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the approximately same age than with people, who are
considerably younger or older [44,45], we introduced a
slight age-dependent bias for the partner selection out
of the total set: The relative probability weight of being
picked is P =e x p ( c Δage), where Δage is the age differ-
ence (in years) of two potential contact partners and c is
a shape parameter modulating how sensitive the selec-
tion process is for age differences. We assume c = -0.02.
Approximately 45 percent of all contacts are made
within the defined subgroups (household, classes and
work groups) - which appears us to be realistic [46]. If
there are no stubs left within the group or if all indivi-
duals within the group have already established contacts
with the individual to be connected, the contact partner
will be automatically chosen from the total set of poten-
tial partners. If there are not enough partners left in the
total set, we allow connecting to individuals from adja-
cent grid cells (von Neumann neighbourhood). This
exemption occurs in less than 2 per thousand of all
individuals to be connected.
Pre-existing immunity, acquired immunity and
vaccination
Modelling seasonal influenza, in contrast to pandemic
influenza, must account for patterns of pre-existing par-
tial or full immunity. For Switzerland no such measures
like the pre-episode hemagglutination-inhibiting (HI)
antibody titres (cf. table five of [47]) are available.
Therefore, we assume here that individuals older than
20 years to have a halved transmission risk [48], i.e. we
multiply the transmission probability for every contact
between an infector and a susceptible individual older
than 20 years by 0.5.
A part of the Swiss population gets vaccinated against
the dominant seasonal influenza strains every year. Sev-
eral sources report vaccination efficacy values between
70 and 90 percent [48-50]. In this paper, we assume
vaccination to reduce the per contact transmission prob-
ability by 80 percent for all age groups. We do not dis-
tinguish further components of vaccine efficacy (e.g.
reduction in infectivity) as the available data is not accu-
rate enough [51].We had no data about the age distribu-
tion of vaccinated people in Switzerland for 2003/2004,
but as the overall vaccination rates (and vaccination
strategies) are similar in the neighbouring countries [52]
we took the age distribution of Germany [53] and
adjusted it proportionally to achieve approximately 1.31
million doses (see also Additional File 1) - a realistic
number for whole Switzerland [54].
After recovery, we assume individuals to be fully
immune for the rest of the simulation run, i.e. they can-
not be re-infected.
Severity of infection and shedding
Only a minor proportion of all seasonal influenza infec-
tions leads to such severe illness that a practitioner’s
advice - or even hospitalization - is needed. The yearly
infection rates reported in the literature range between
5 and 30 percent (most of them between 10 and 20 per-
cent) [49,55-58], but only approximately 2-3 percent of
the Swiss population seek out a general practitioner due
to an ILI during the influenza season every year.
Influenza occurs with varying severity and can be even
completely asymptomatic [59]. The exact proportion of
asymptomatic infection and of the different levels of
severity is unknown. Modelling studies used proportions
of asymptomatic infection between 30 and 50 percent
Table 4 Contact data
Age group Empirical
mean [44]
1
Mean household
contacts in CH
2
Mean activities per
person
3
Mean contacts per
activity [SD]
4
Median contacts per
activity [IQR]
4
0-4 10.21 2.95 1.29 5.62 [4.0] 5 [3-8]
5-9 14.81 3.23 1.52 7.6 [5.2] 7 [4-10]
10-14 18.22 3.23 1.54 9.75 [6.4] 9 [5-13]
15-19 17.58 2.98 2.29 6.38 [4.5] 6 [3-9]
20-29 13.57 2.12 2.06 5.56 [4.0] 5 [3-8]
30-39 14.14 2.40 1.91 6.14 [4.3] 5 [3-8]
40-49 13.83 2.52 1.90 5.95 [4.2] 5 [3-8]
50-59 12.30 1.63 1.87 5.70 [4.1] 5 [3-8]
60-69 9.21 1.32 1.72 4.58 [3.4] 4 [2-6]
70+ 6.89 1.39 1.82 3.02 [2.5] 3 [1-4]
1Average number of contact partners per day as measured by Mossong et al.
2Average number of contact partners within the individuals’ household. Calculations are based on the Swiss census (Volkszählung 2000) and we assume that all
individuals living in one household interact in a potentially contagious manner on a daily base.
3Average number of distinct activities performed by one individual per day.
4We assume that the number of contacts per activity follows a negative binomial distribution. The two columns describe the distributions that were determined
to achieve a plausible overall contact distribution (see the “Realizing contacts” section).
Smieszek et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2011, 11:115
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/11/115
Page 8 of 18[6,8,9,60-62]. Wright et al. reported an asymptomatic
infection rate of 37 percent in children [63]. Carrat et
al. re-analysed volunteer challenge studies and found
that the proportion of infected individuals showing any
kind of symptoms was 66.9 percent (CI: 58.3, 74.5) -
however, only 34.9 percent (CI: 26.7, 44.2) reported
fever [64]. Fox et al. [47] showed that the proportions of
different levels of severity depend on age and pre-epi-
sode hemagglutination-inhibiting (HI) antibody titre.
In addition, the relative infectiousness of asympto-
matic, mild, moderate and severe cases is not known.
The infectiousness can be represented as a function of
the viral shedding [32], quite often simplified as a linear
relation [8,64]. There is only little known about the
shedding behavior of asymptomatic cases (and, thus,
about their infectiousness) [59,64]. However, in two stu-
dies a positive correlation was found between the quan-
tity of virus per positive specimen and the reported
severity of illness [65,66]. For the case of the 1918/19
pandemic influenza in Geneva, Chowell et al. estimated
the relative infectiousness of asymptomatic cases to be
negligibly small [67]. Ferguson et al. assume severe cases
to be twice as infectious as mild cases based on house-
hold data [8,9]. Eichner et al. assume asymptomatic
cases to be half as infectious as moderate or severe
cases [68]. The empirical work of Couch et al. showed
that the mean quantity of virus detected in specimens of
nasal wash was only approx. half in case of asympto-
matic infection compared to symptomatic infection
(cf. figure one of [66]).
For this paper we decided to distinguish two groups of
illness severity: We assume that 50 percent of the infec-
tions end up in moderate to severe illness (subsequently
referred to as symptomatic cases) and that 50 percent of
the infections are asymptomatic or very mild cases
(referred to as asymptomatic cases). We further assume
that the latter group is half as infectious as the first
group. Although in reality there is an interaction between
age, pre-existing immunity and illness severity, we sim-
plify here and assume illness severity to be a random out-
come completely independent of the other two factors.
Incubation period and infectiousness over time
Anderson and May specify the incubation period of
influenza as between one and three days [69]. Lange and
Vogel deem the onset of symptoms to be 24 hours after
inoculation (cf. figure three.two in [49]). Most empirical
studies report the onset of symptoms to be within the
first one or two days after inoculation [8,64]. In our
simulation model the step width is one day, i.e. we can
implement the course of a disease with such a precision.
We assume here - simplifying reality - that the latency
period equals the incubation period and that virus shed-
ding always starts the day after inoculation.
Various numbers for the infectious period can be
found in literature: Anderson and May assume the
infectious period to be two to three days [69]. Wearing
et al. use for their model of an influenza outbreak in an
English boarding school infectious periods of 2.1 to
2.2 days (depending on the make of the model) [70].
Eichner et al. implement a “fully contagious period” of
4.1 days for asymptomatic and moderately sick adults
and of 7.0 days for all other groups [68]. However, most
simulation models assume the infectiousness to be con-
stant during the infectious period. We describe the
infectiousness over time by a function estimated by Fer-
guson et al. [9] based on shedding data: They assume
the infectiousness over time to follow a lognormal func-
tion (T,δ,g)w i t hδ[log(d)]= -0.72 and g[log(d)]= -1.8
(for details cf. to pp. 10 and table SI1 of the supplemen-
tary material of [9]; see also Additional File 1). We trun-
cated this function after seven days for both the
symptomatic and the asymptomatic group.
The total infectiousness (over the seven days of infec-
tion) can be varied by multiplying the values for every
single day by a constant factor. The previously presented
model parameters are listed in Table 5.
Initial seed
Defining the initial seed is a particularly critical modeling
decision and complicated task. Regarding the seasonality
of influenza, it is not entirely clear to what degree influ-
enza viruses outlive the summer between two influenza
seasons and whether they are reintroduced from other
Table 5 Model parameters for the 2003/2004 influenza
epidemic in Switzerland
Relative susceptibility
Individuals aged 20 or younger 100%
Individuals older than 20 50%
Vaccination
Vaccination efficacy 80%
Doses 1.31 million
Severity of infection (frequency)
Severe and moderate cases 50%
Mild and asymptomatic cases 50%
Course of infection
Incubation period 1 day
Infectious period 7 days
Relative and absolute infectiousness
Severe and moderate cases 100%
Mild and asymptomatic cases 50%
Relative infectiousness over time lognormal decay with
δ[log(d)]= -0.72 and g
[log(d)]= -1.8
Absolute per-contact infection probability
(averaged over infectious period and assuming
100% infectiousness and 100% susceptibility)
1.1693 10
-2
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valent in several regions within Europe at the same time -
and therefore multiple ports of entry are possible.
Furthermore, the geospatial information coming from
sentinel systems is worst at the beginning of an epidemic:
In contrast to the epidemic phase during which the posi-
tive predictive value of practitioners’ diagnoses is around
four-fifth [71-73], it is around one-third in absence of a
known epidemic in various studies and different age
groups [49,74,75]. At the same time, random variation is
particularly critical for the further spread during the early
phase of an outbreak [76].
We decided to take the sentinel report of the 49th
week as starting point for the initialization. For each of
the 293 cases reported in this week, an agent with the
same age and residential municipality was randomly
identified in the synthetic population and symptomati-
cally infected. The actual status in the course of infec-
tiousness was attributed randomly using a uniform
probability distribution.
The chosen approach combines various requirements:
(i) The 49th week is the first sentinel week with clear
signs of an outbreak in the westernmost parts of Swit-
zerland while the rest of Switzerland is still pre-
epidemic. Such a “headstart” of the Geneva region is
necessary to be able to reproduce the spatial patterns
observed. At the same time early cases in the rest of
Switzerland are realistically captured by this initializa-
tion. (ii) Although the age distribution of the cases
reported within the sentinel system is biased (the help
seeking behaviour varies across age groups), we can
assume that these cases reflect the real age distribution
better than e.g. random choice. (iii) 293 initial cases are
negligible compared to the total population size and,
thus, still a reasonable starting point for model
initialization.
Model calibration
What remains to be calibrated are the overall infectious-
ness of the disease and the proportion of symptomatic
cases which is diagnosed with influenza by a practi-
tioner. We assume the latter proportion to be constant
over the entire epidemic season. We further assume per-
fect diagnosis accuracy, i.e. 100% sensitivity and specifi-
city, and that the extrapolated sentinel data can directly
be compared with the respective proportion of the
symptomatic cases coming from the simulation runs.
We further compare only the weeks 47 to 52 (2003) and
2 to 15 (2004). The first week of 2004 is excluded from
t h ea n a l y s i sa n dc a l i b r a t i o np r o c e d u r ea sw ed on o t
know to what degree the observed drop in cases reflects
a real decline and to what degree this is a simple mea-
surement error (cf. to the discussion below). In order
to compare the weekly sentinel data with the daily
simulation data, the latter had to be converted into
weekly data, too. We did this with floating week bound-
aries, i.e. the definition which simulation days should be
the beginning of a report week was flexible and chosen
in a way to achieve maximum fit with the measured
data. The peak of the epidemic was assumed to be in
the second week of 2004.
We started our calibration procedure with an arbitra-
rily chosen mean (i.e. averaged over the seven days an
individual stays infectious) per-contact infection prob-
ability for symptomatic cases of 1.129.10
-2.W ec o m -
pared the fit (least squares) of this parameter setting
with three higher and three lower values for the mean
per-contact infection probability. The increment was
5.65 10
-4 ( i . e .5p e r c e n to ft h es t a r tv a l u e ) .T h et w o
parameter values that fitted best were the start value
and the next higher value (which fitted also far better
than the start value). We then analyzed the parameter
range between the two best values starting from the
higher value and approaching the lower with an incre-
ment of 1.6 10
-4. The best accordance with the empiri-
cal epidemic curve was achieved for a mean per-contact
infection probability of 1.1693 10
-2. The proportion of
symptomatic cases that has to be diagnosed by a practi-
tioner to reproduce the extrapolated empirical curve
best (least squares) is approximately one-third.
Results and discussion
Epidemic curve, overall infection rate and reproduction
number
Epidemic curve
The extrapolated epidemic curve of the 2003/2004
H3N2 epidemic and the corresponding average values
and standard deviations of 30 simulation runs are
shown in Figure 2. The weeks of the year 2003 and the
weeks two to five of 2004 are reproduced quite well by
the model. The model overshoots the extrapolated value
of the first week of 2004 (began on 29 December 2003)
a lot and it undershoots the extrapolated sentinel data
of the weeks six to twelve systematically.
There are several explanations for the difference in the
first week of 2004 including:
(i) This week is part of the Swiss Christmas vacations
and children do not go to school. Children are seen as a
major pacemaker for the spread of seasonal influenza
[77] and school is one of the most important places to
make contact with other children [78,79]. A study con-
ducted by Cauchemez et al. showed a relation between
school vacation and a decrease in infection rates in
France [80]; Heymann et al. were able to show similar
results for the 1999/2000 influenza epidemic in Israel
when teachers went on strike during the influenza sea-
son [81]. However, another study conducted by Rodri-
guez et al. failed to show such an association in a survey
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schools [82]. Hence, there might be a real drop in cases
during the Swiss Christmas vacations due to school clo-
sure, but such an effect is neither proven nor quantified.
(ii) It is not only plausible to expect fewer infections
during school vacations, but also to expect fewer consul-
tations: Many patients with influenza-like symptoms
normally do not seek out the practitioner primarily
because they want treatment, but for a sick note for
school or the employer. As many offices and all schools
were closed in this first week of 2004, also many sick
people did not need such a medical certificate. Conse-
quently, most likely a smaller proportion of the sympto-
matic cases sought out a practitioner than usual.
It is further not clear, what causality is behind the
undershooting during the tapering phase of the epi-
demic curve. Plausible explanations are:
(i) The epidemic peaked quite late in the German and
Italian neighbourhood of Switzerland. A possible expla-
nation for the comparatively slow decay in the Swiss
sentinel data might be that constantly new sources of
infection were introduced from the neighbourhood and
prevented the disease from dying out earlier. The spatial
distribution of the reported cases at the end of the
2003/2004 epidemic appears to support this interpreta-
tion as the focal points of infections seems to be at the
German and Italian borders. However, such transborder
processes are not reflected in our model.
(ii) We have seen that the diagnostic accuracy is good
during the peak phase, but comparatively poor when
influenza is not abundant. Hence, it is likely that senti-
nel extrapolations overestimate the number of new
cases during the early and the late phase of an epidemic.
Particularly at the end of an outbreak after a phase
when influenza diagnoses were quite common, practi-
tioners might be prone to diagnose influenza too
inattentively.
(iii) It might be possible that sick people are more
likely to seek a practitioner’s help later in an epidemic
when there is widespread recognition that an epidemic
is occurring.
(iv) We assume the infectiousness of the infective
agent to be constant over time. However, influenza is a
q u i c k l ym u t a t i n gv i r u s[ 8 3 ]a n dw eh a v ee v i d e n c et h a t
the risk of infection is partly modulated e.g. by climatic
conditions [84,85]. If - for whatever reason - there was a
rise in infectiousness of the 2003/2004 H3N2 strain, this
could also explain why the extrapolated measurements
decay more slowly than the simulated values.
Overall infection rate
The simulated overall infection rate is 14.9 percent for
one influenza season. There is no serological data for
the 2003/2004 H3N2 epidemic in Switzerland we could
compare this simulated value to. However, various
sources state that between 5 and 20 percent [57] or
between 10 and 20 percent [49] of the population in a
Western context become sick of influenza every year,
which is the range of our results.
Reproduction number
In case of seasonal influenza it makes more sense to
refer to the effective reproduction number than to the
basic reproduction number, because the infectious agent
never hits a fully susceptible population and, thus, the
basic reproduction number is only of theoretical value.
We show the time-development of the reproduction
number of our simulation runs in Figure 4. When the
disease hits the unaffected population during the early
phase of the epidemic, reproduction numbers range
b e t w e e n1 . 2a n d1 . 3 .T h i si si na c c o r d a n c ew i t ht h e
results reported in studies on influenza spread: Chowell
et al. analyzed influenza seasons in the USA, France and
Australia from 1972 to 1997 and found for all three
countries mean reproduction numbers of 1.3 (CI 1.2-
1.4) [57]. Nishiura et al. report maximum likelihood
estimates for the reproduction number of the 2009
H1N1 epidemic in Japan between 1.21 and 1.35 [76].
Age-dependent infection rates and time of infection
Infection rates
Figure 5 shows the simulated mean age-dependent
infection rates. Children (all persons younger than 20)
have clearly the highest simulated infection rates with
33.0 percent, whereas adults show only attack rates of
9.5 percent. These simulated results are in accordance
with general empirical data on seasonal influenza out-
breaks: Several sources state that children are consider-
ably more affected than adults [49,55]. Nicholson et al.
estimate that approximately 20 percent of children and
5 percent of adults worldwide develop symptomatic
Figure 4 Reproduction number versus time of infection.T h e
grey lines show the development of the reproduction number
(defined as the average number of secondary cases) of each
individual simulation run. The red line is the average of all runs. The
abscissa represents the time-point (in days) when an infector started
shedding.
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infection rates of children in a range between 20 and 30
percent [56].
Figures 5a and 5b further show serologic age-depen-
dent infection rates measured for five influenza seasons
in Tecumseh, Michigan, [86] and Seattle, Washington
[87]. Although there is a pronounced variability in infec-
tion rates, clear patterns are visible in the serologic data,
which are also reproduced by the model in a qualitative
sense: (i) In most cases, the infection rates of children
are twice to three times as high than those of adults. (ii)
Very young children and adolescent, almost adult indivi-
duals show frequently lower infection rates than chil-
dren between five and 14 years of age.
The patterns observed in the serologic data as well as in
the simulation results can be explained by the following
mechanisms: (i) Practically every child over twelve years of
age has been challenged with influenza during their life-
time [56]. Every exposure to influenza confers specific
immunity against the respective strain and partial immu-
nity against kindred strains. We have implemented this
mechanism by assuming that adulthood is 50 percent pro-
tective. (ii) Differences in the mean number of contact
partners can also explain the observed differences partly.
People with many contacts have more chances of infecting
others or of becoming infected than people with few con-
tacts. Particularly, the differences within the age group of
children can be partly attributed to differences in the
number of contact partners (cf. Table 4 and Figures 5a
and 5b). (iii) The actual arrangement of contacts also
determines infection rates. It is known, for instance,
that children tend to have most of their contacts with
other children of the same age. If a certain age group
has in average more contacts than another, such age assor-
tativeness means that individuals with many contacts pre-
ferentially meet also other individuals with many contacts
- which results in a further elevated risk of infection.
Time of infection
If we relate the average age of infected individuals to
their time of infection, we see a clear increase in average
age in both sentinel and simulated data. We calculated
linear regression models with point in time as indepen-
dent variable and average age of reported cases as depen-
dent variable.
For the sentinel data, we observe an increase in the
average age of reported cases of approx. 0.32 years every
day, if we look only at the swelling phase of the epi-
demic between weeks 49 in 2003 and two in 2004. After
the peak in week two has been passed, the average age
of the reported cases decreases again. However, for the
w h o l ee p i d e m i cp h a s e( f r o mw e e k4 8i n2 0 0 3t ow e e k
five in 2004), there is still an increase in the average age
of 0.10 years each day. In case of the simulated data, we
calculate a median slope of 0.081 years (IQR 0.076-
0.092 of age) per day for the simulation time range
between the days 30 and 100.
These increases in the average age of the cases can be
explained by the hypothesized pacemaker function of
children. Theoretical modelling studies showed that
highly connected persons get infected earlier and more
often and play a more important role as infectors than
rather isolated persons [88,89]. We know from literature
[44] and have implemented in our model that children
have in average more contact partners per day than
adults. The increase in average age by time we see analo-
gously in the sentinel and simulated data is most likely
caused by this mechanism: First, the susceptible and
highly connected children of a region get infected. Then,
the partly-immune and less connected adults follow.
Spatial spread of the influenza epidemic
The spatial dynamics of the 2003/2004 H3N2 epidemic
are visible in Figure 1, which shows the epidemic curves
Figure 5 Age-dependent infection rates. Subfigure a: The lines
show the serological age-dependent infection rates measured for
five influenza seasons in Tecumseh, Michigan [86]; the bars show
the corresponding average infection rates of our simulation model.
Subfigure b: The lines show the serological age-dependent infection
rates measures for two influenza seasons in Seattle, Washington
[87]; the bars show the corresponding simulated infection rates.
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sentinel data. It is clearly observable, that the epidemic
broke out in the Geneva region, which is the western-
most part of Switzerland. It moved from there over Lau-
s a n n ea n dB e r n et o w a r d st h en o r t h - e a s t e r np a r t so f
Switzerland with the cities Zurich and St Gallen. At last,
it reached the canton of Ticino in the south-east of
Switzerland, here represented by the city of Lugano.
Table 6 provides the median duration from the peak
in one city to the peak in another city as well as the
inter-quartile range as resulted in the 30 simulation
runs. The median durations of the 30 simulation runs
are consistent with the time lags that can be observed in
the measured data. Most of the simulation runs also
showed a clear movement from the west to the east
with Ticino having the latest of all peaks. One exemp-
lary run is shown in Figure 6 and movies of six selected
runs are given in the online Additional Files 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
and 7.
These observations regarding the spatial patterns of
influenza spread can be interpreted in manifold ways.
First, it must be stated that the spatial spread of influ-
enza given certain initial conditions is a stochastic pro-
cess. Nishiura et al. [76] showed clearly that during the
early phase of an outbreak parameters like the reproduc-
tion rate can be highly fluctuating - and in a spatially
explicit model we observe these random fluctuations at
every place where the disease is newly introduced:
Before a certain point of no return has been passed
locally, it is a random process whether the local out-
break dies off again or can be sustained.
It is also a matter of chance whether there is e.g. an
infector travelling very early from Geneva to Lugano
and causing an outbreak there or whether Lugano is
reached rather late. However, we claim that there are
typical time lags between the peaks in different regions
of Switzerland: There are hubs - like Zurich - which are
origin, stopover or final destination for many activities.
These hubs are highly connected with the rest of the
country by large traffic flows and are, thus, likely to
become affected by an epidemic quite early. On the
other hand, there are remote regions - like the lower
Engadin in the south-western part of the Alps - which
have good chances to be spared for quite a long time.
The canton of Ticino with the city of Lugano is geogra-
phically isolated from the rest of Switzerland by the
Alps and strongly oriented towards Italy, which might
explain why it was affected last by the 2003/2004
epidemic.
Consequently, we believe that analyzing spatial pat-
terns and cautiously comparing simulated patterns with
observed patterns is meaningful, although random varia-
tion in both reality and simulation can lead to atypical,
i.e. improbable, outcomes.
Limitations of the model and the study design
Limitations of the overall study design
We chose a particular influenza season in order to
reconstruct it and justified this case selection. We took
the stance that every single aspect of an influenza out-
break which can be reproduced is a cue for the validity
of a modelling approach. However, reproducing one
particular outbreak should be just a starting point for a
validation strategy. Further suitable data sets - such as
sentinel data of other influenza seasons or mortality
data - should be identified for challenging the proposed
influenza model for gaining more certainty that the pre-
sented model captures influenza dynamics reasonably
well.
Another potential limitation is the number of simula-
tion runs calculated for each parameter setting. How-
ever, we calculated the standard errors of the means for
critical simulation outcomes (e.g. the overall and the
age-dependent infection rates as well as the simulation
time until the peak is reached) and all of them were
very low. Hence, we conclude that the chosen number
of simulation runs is sufficient.
Limitations of the empirical data
The reconstruction of a seasonal influenza outbreak in
Switzerland rests upon general knowledge about seaso-
nal influenza reported in the literature and upon senti-
nel information about Switzerland and the surrounding
countries.
On the one hand, seasonal influenza is extremely vari-
able in its actual characteristics (cf. e.g. the enormous
variability in the age-dependent attack rates shown in
Table 6 Median duration from peak to peak and inter-quartile range
Geneva Lausanne Berne Basle Zurich Lugano
St Gallen 4.0 [3.1-4.3] 2.1 [1.3-2.7] 0.4 [-0.4-1.5] -0.5 [-1.3-0.1] 0.0 [-0.6-0.6] -2.0 [-3.5–0.9]
Lugano 5.8 [4.8-7.1] 4.5 [3.6-5.6] 2.9 [1.7-3.9] 1.8 [0.2-3.0] 2.4 [1.1-3.0]
Zurich 3.9 [3.0-4.6] 2.2 [1.2-3.0] 0.5 [-0.1-1.4] -0.7 [-1.3-0.3]
Basle 4.6 [3.0-5.4] 2.7 [1.6-3.7] 1.1 [0.1-2.1]
Berne 3.1 [2.4-4.0] 1.7 [0.8-2.4]
Lausanne 1.4 [1.1-2.0]
The epidemic curves were smoothed with a moving average of five days for identifying stable peak days.
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only serve as heuristics and not as precise parameter
estimates. Further, one has to note that important fac-
tors such as social contact structure vary in different
cultural contexts (cf. differences between ten European
countries reported in [44]) and, thus, the generalizability
of findings to a different social context is limited. There-
fore, country-specific data would be needed to adapt the
model to other settings.
On the other hand, sentinel data can give only a biased
image of reality and have to be interpreted with caution:
As mentioned, there is a tendency to overestimate the
number of new cases in the early and late phase of an
outbreak when true cases are not abundant. Sentinel sys-
tems can only record correctly diagnosed, symptomatic
cases which seek out a practitioner. Accordingly, all
asymptomatic cases and all sick individuals that do
not see a practitioner and all false diagnoses remain
Figure 6 Simulated spatial outbreak patterns.T h i sf i g u r es h o w st h ep r e v a l e n c eo fi n f l u e n za in the course of simulation time for one
simulation run.
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age-dependent and the consultation rates differ also most
likely between age groups and between the different parts
of Switzerland. Finally, it is not clear whether and - if so
- to what degree vacations lead to reporting biases.
For future studies, it would be optimal to have seaso-
nal epidemics for which both sentinel data and serologic
information about the overall and the age-dependent
infection rate is available. Relying solely on sentinel data
is accompanied by a considerable uncertainty regarding
the infection rate estimate and age-dependent infection
rates as one can only reproduce general knowledge
instead of outbreak-specific data.
Limitations of the model structure
There are several limitations in the model itself. For
instance, it is known that traffic and activity patterns dif-
fer vastly between weekdays and weekends [90] - but we
assumed weekday patterns throughout the simulation.
We further have included neither voluntary home
confinement nor changed patterns due to vacations or
other events in our model. We think the former is an
acceptable assumption given that we do not know real-
world rates of home confinement and given that the
severity of symptoms seems to lag the shedding rate
slightly [49] and, thus, infectors are likely to expose the
community to influenza during their most infectious
phase. The latter might be part of the explanation for
t h ed i f f e r e n c eb e t w e e nt h em o d e lo u t c o m ea n dt h e
extrapolated sentinel data in the first week of 2004.
Though this could in principle be implemented in our
model, we currently also do not distinguish the prob-
ability of becoming a symptomatic or asymptomatic
case depending on the immunity status of the respective
host. We acknowledge that, for instance, the effects of
vaccination are much more complex than reducing the
probability of becoming infected by a constant factor
irrespective of age and pre-existing immunity status.
While differentiated vaccination efficacy parameters
would be essential in studies on the effect of different
vaccination strategies, the impact of our simplification is
acceptably low in our concrete setting. We tested how
sensitive our results react on changes of the vaccination
efficacy and we found that a 25% drop in the assumed
efficacy results only in an 8.7% increase in the overall
infection rate, i.e. from 14.9% to 16.2%. No considerable
changes in the temporal dynamics were observable.
These findings can be explained with the low vaccina-
tion rates in Switzerland, particularly with the very low
rates in young individuals.
Finally, we assume all contacts between an infector
and a susceptible person to lead to infection with equal
probability irrespective of the duration and the intensity
of the contact, which is also known to be a simplifica-
tion of reality [32]. In our simulation model, the average
number of secondary cases per infector is approximately
linearly related to the number of contact partners. We
believe that this relation is sub-linear in reality.
Conclusions
This paper had two purposes: (i) A spatially explicit,
individual-based model for influenza spread should be
introduced and (ii) validated with empirical data from
the 2003/2004 H3N2 influenza epidemic. We succeeded
in compiling a simulation model, which is capable of
reproducing main characteristics of the 2003/2004 H3N2
epidemic in Switzerland and seasonal influenza in gen-
eral. Namely, we were able to reproduce the following
characteristics:
1.) The shape of the epidemic curve was similar in
model and extrapolated Swiss sentinel data; overall
infection rates and reproduction numbers were in the
same range as reported for several outbreaks in various
countries.
2.) As we had no empirical data on the age-dependent
infection rates for the 2003/2004 H3N2 epidemic in
Switzerland, simulated patterns had to be compared
with observed patterns from other contexts. Nonethe-
less, the simulated infection rates and the patterns
observed during seven outbreaks in two US municipali-
ties are in good qualitative accordance.
3.) The empirical data show a clear spread along the
main transport axes: The epidemic started at the wes-
ternmost tip of Switzerland and moved along the main
axes to the north-east and from there to the rather iso-
lated canton of Ticino in the south-east. This pattern
could be reproduced with our model and median time
lags between different cities were in good accordance
with the observed data.
With this study, we showed that finding evidence for
the validity of influenza models by challenging them
with seasonal influenza outbreak data is possible. Vali-
dating the structure of influenza models with seasonal
influenza data seems us to be a good strategy for mak-
ing - inherently hypothetical - pandemic models more
credible: If a model succeeded in reproducing several
aspects of seasonal influenza, it is also likely to generate
adequate results for pandemic scenarios.
Further case examples should be reconstructed for
gaining more certainty regarding the model’s validity.
The highest uncertainties in our model lie in the pat-
terns of pre-existing immunity, the proportion and
infectiousness of asymptomatic cases and age-dependent
attack rates. All these uncertainties could be approached
with a longitudinal serological study measuring antibody
titres before and after the seasonal influenza period
designed as complement to the existing sentinel systems.
For better pandemic planning and better informed deci-
sions in the field of seasonal influenza, public health
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nita in more depth.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Additional information on the model parameters
and structure. This supplementary material file provides additional
information on several parameters of the simulation and flowcharts
describing the central algorithms of the simulation model.
Additional file 2: Sample movie of simulated influenza spread 1.
This movie shows one exemplary simulation run of a simulated seasonal
influenza epidemic in Switzerland. The colour scheme illustrates the
number of new influenza cases per square kilometre and time step.
Additional file 3: Sample movie of simulated influenza spread 2.
This movie shows one exemplary simulation run of a simulated seasonal
influenza epidemic in Switzerland. The colour scheme illustrates the
number of new influenza cases per square kilometre and time step.
Additional file 4: Sample movie of simulated influenza spread 3.
This movie shows one exemplary simulation run of a simulated seasonal
influenza epidemic in Switzerland. The colour scheme illustrates the
number of new influenza cases per square kilometre and time step.
Additional file 5: Sample movie of simulated influenza spread 4.
This movie shows one exemplary simulation run of a simulated seasonal
influenza epidemic in Switzerland. The colour scheme illustrates the
number of new influenza cases per square kilometre and time step.
Additional file 6: Sample movie of simulated influenza spread 5.
This movie shows one exemplary simulation run of a simulated seasonal
influenza epidemic in Switzerland. The colour scheme illustrates the
number of new influenza cases per square kilometre and time step.
Additional file 7: Sample movie of simulated influenza spread 6.
This movie shows one exemplary simulation run of a simulated seasonal
influenza epidemic in Switzerland. The colour scheme illustrates the
number of new influenza cases per square kilometre and time step.
List of abbreviations
CI: 95 percent confidence interval; ILI: influenza-like illness; IQR: inter-quartile
range; SD: standard deviation
Acknowledgements
The project was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (projects
320030-114122 and 32003B_127548). The Swiss sentinel data and the data
of Table 1 were provided by the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health (BAG).
The databases mentioned in Table 2 were provided by the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office (BfS) and the Swiss Federal Office for Spatial Development
(ARE). Permission to use the data is granted for scientific research. We thank
the three referees for their thorough review and their important comments.
We further thank Lena Fiebig, Saša Parađ and Justus Gallati for their valuable
comments.
Author details
1Institute for Environmental Decisions, Natural and Social Science Interface,
ETH Zurich, Universitaetsstrasse 22, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland.
2Institute for
Transport Planning and Systems, ETH Zurich, Wolfgang-Pauli-Strasse 15, 8093
Zurich, Switzerland.
3Department of Public Health and Epidemiology, Swiss
Tropical and Public Health Institute, Socinstrasse 57, 4002 Basel, Switzerland.
4University of Basel, P.O. Box, 4003 Basel, Switzerland.
Authors’ contributions
TS designed the influenza model, carried out the epidemiological parts of
the simulation work, contributed to the quality control of the Swiss MATSim
scenario, reviewed the literature and wrote this paper as lead author. MB is
one of the head developers of the MATSim project. He carried out the
transportation part of the simulation work and helped to draft the
manuscript. JH parameterized the infectiousness over time and contributed
to the geographical analysis of the simulated data and helped to draft the
manuscript. KWA and RWS contributed to the contact network parts of the
study design whereas JZ contributed to the disease biology part of the
study design. All of them contributed to the manuscript. All authors read
and approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 25 May 2010 Accepted: 9 May 2011 Published: 9 May 2011
References
1. Bonmarin I, Levy-Bruhl D: Apport des modélisations des épidémies dans
la décision de santé publique: exemple de la pandémie grippale. Méd
Mal Infect 2007, 37:S204-S209.
2. Eynard F, Koch D, Birrer A, Boubaker K, Matter HC, Raeber PA, Influenza
Working Group (AGI): Swiss influenza pandemic plan: Strategies and
measures in preparation for an influenza pandemic.Edited by: Bern, CH.
Bundesamt für Gesundheit (BAG); 2009:, January 2009.
3. Eichner M, Schwehm M, Wilson N, Baker MG: Small islands and pandemic
influenza: potential benefits and limitations of travel volume reduction
as a border control measure. BMC Infect Dis 2009, 9:160.
4. Arino J, Brauer F, van den Driessche P, Watmough J, Wu J: A model for
influenza with vaccination and antiviral treatment. J Theor Biol 2008,
253:118-130.
5. Carpenter C, Sattenspiel L: The design and use of an agent-based model
to simulatie the 1918 influenza epidemic at Norway House, Manitoba.
Am J Hum Biol 2009, 21:290-300.
6. Ciofi degli Atti ML, Merler S, Rizzo C, Ajelli M, Massari M, Manfredi P,
Furlanello C, Scalia Tomba G, Iannelli M: Mitigation measures for
pandemic influenza in Italy: An individual based model considering
different scenarios. PLoS One 2008, 3:e1790.
7. Das TK, Savachkin AA, Zhu Y: A large-scale simulation model of pandemic
influenza outbreaks for development of dynamic mitigation strategies.
IIE Transactions 2008, 40:893-905.
8. Ferguson NM, Cummings DA, Fraser C, Cajka JC, Cooley PC, Burke DS:
Strategies for mitigating an influenza pandemic. Nature 2006,
442:448-452.
9. Ferguson NM, Cummings DAT, Cauchemez S, Fraser C, Riley S, Meeyai A,
Iamsirithaworn S, Burke DS: Strategies for containing an emerging
influenza pandemic in Southeast Asia. Nature 2005, 437(7056):209-214.
10. Ohkusa Y, Sugawara T: Simulation model of pandemic influenza in the
whole of Japan. Jpn J Infect Dis 2009, 62:98-106.
11. Nishiura H, Wilson N, Baker MG: Quarantine for pandemic influenza
control at the border of small island nations. BMC Infect Dis 2009, 9:27.
12. Duerr HP, Brockmann SO, Piechotowski I, Schwehm M, Eichner M: Influenza
pandemic intervention planning using InfluSim: pharmaceutical and
non-pharmaceutical interventions. BMC Infect Dis 2007, 7:76.
13. Rakowski F, Gruziel M, Bieniasz-Krzywiec Ł, Radomski JP: Influenza epidemic
spread simulation for Poland - a large scale, individual based model
study. Physica A 2010, 389:3149-3165.
14. Gilbert N, Troitzsch KG: Simulation for the social scientist. Buckingham:
Open University Press; 1999.
15. Barlas Y, Carpenter S: Philosophical roots of model validation: two
paradigms. Syst Dynam Rev 1990, 6:148-166.
16. Kleindorfer GB, O’Neill L, Ganeshan R: Validation in simulation: various
positions in the philosophy of Science. Manage Sci 1998, 44:1087-1099.
17. McAvaney BJ, Covey C, Joussaume S, Kattsov V, Kitoh A, Ogana W,
Pitman AJ, Weaver AJ, Wood RA, Zhao ZC: Model evaluation. In Climate
change 2001: the scientific basis Contribution of working group I to the third
assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Edited
by: Houghton JT, Ding Y, Griggs DJ, Noguer M, van der Linden PJ, Dai X,
Maskell K, Johnson CA. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press;
471-524.
18. Multi-Agent Transport Simulation Toolkit | MATSim. [http://matsim.org].
19. Paget J, Marquet R, Meijer A, van der Velden K: Influenza activity in Europe
during eight seasons (1999-2007): an evaluation of the indicators used
to measure activity and an assessment of the timing, length and course
of peak activity (spread) across Europe. BMC Infect Dis 2007, 7:141.
20. Bläuer Herrmann A, Capezzali E, Farine A, Kreis S, Lässig V, Murier T,
Perrenoud S, Saucy F: Arbeitsmarktindikatoren 2009. Neuchâtel, CH: Office
fédéral de la statistique; 2009.
Smieszek et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2011, 11:115
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/11/115
Page 16 of 1821. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Influenza (AGI): Abschlussbericht der Influenzasaison
2003/04. Berlin: Robert Koch Institut; 2004.
22. Das schweizerische Sentinella-Meldesystem. [http://www.bag.admin.ch/
k_m_meldesystem/00736/00817/index.html?lang=de].
23. Atkinson M, Wein L: Quantifying the routes of transmission for pandemic
influenza. Bull Math Biol 2008, 70:820-867.
24. Tellier R: Review of aerosol transmission of influenza A virus. Emerg Infect
Dis 2006, 12:1657-1662.
25. Gregg MB: The epidemiology of influenza in humans. In Annals of the
New York Academy of Sciences: Airborne Contagion. Volume 353. Edited by:
Kundsin RB. New York, NY: New York Academy of Sciences; 1980.
26. Lemieux C, Brankston G, Gitterman L, Hirji Z, Gardam M: Questioning
aerosol transmission of influenza. Emerg Infect Dis 2007, 13:173-174.
27. Brankston G, Gitterman L, Hirji Z, Lemieux C, Gardam M: Transmission of
influenza A in human beings. Lancet Infect Dis 2007, 7(4):257-265.
28. Moser MR, Bender TR, Margolis HS, Noble GR, Kendal AP, Ritter DG: An
outbreak of influenza aboard a commercial airliner. Am J Epidemiol 1979,
110:1-6.
29. Han K, Zhu X, He F, Liu L, Zhang L, Ma H, Tang X, Huang T, Zeng G,
Zhu BP: Lack of airborne transmission during outbreak of pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 among tour group members, China, June 2009. Emerg Infect
Dis 2009, 15:1578-1581.
30. Wasserman S, Faust K: Social network analysis: methods and applications.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press; 1994.
31. Li Y, Leung GM, Tang JW, Yang X, Chao CYH, Lin JZ, Lu JW, Nielsen PV, Niu J,
Qian H, Sleigh AC, Su H-JJ, Sundell J, Wong TW, Yuen PL: Role of ventilation
in airborne transmission of infectious agents in the built environment - a
multidisciplinary systematic review. Indoor Air 2007, 17:2-18.
32. Smieszek T: A mechanistic model of infection: why duration and
intensity of contacts should be included in models of disease spread.
Theor Biol Med Model 2009, 6:25.
33. Eubank S, Guclu H, Kumar VSA, Marathe MV, Srinivasan A, Toroczkal Z,
Wang N: Modelling disease outbreaks in realistic urban social networks.
Nature 2004, 429:180-184.
34. Eubank S: Network based models of infectious disease spread. Jpn J
Infect Dis 2005, 58:S9-S13.
35. Rakowski F, Gruziel M, Krych M, Radomski JP: Large scale daily contacts
and mobility model - an individual-based countrywide simulation study
for Poland. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 2010, 13(1):13
[http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/13/1/13.html].
36. Balmer M, Horni A, Charypar D, Meister K, Ciari F, Axhausen KW:
Schlussbericht. Wirkungen der Westumfahrung Zürich: Analyse mit einer
agentenbasierten Mikrosimulation.Edited by: Institute for Transport
Planning and Systems. Zurich: ETH Zurich; 2009550.
37. Ciari F, Balmer M, Axhausen KW: A new mode choice model for a multi-
agent transport simulation. 8th Swiss Transport Research Conference
Ascona, CH; 2008.
38. Balmer M, Axhausen KW, Nagel K: Agent-based demand-modeling
framework for large-scale microsimulations. Transport Res Rec 2006,
1985:125-134.
39. Balmer M, Rieser M, Meister K, Charypar D, Lefebvre N, Nagel K: MATSim-T:
architecture and simulation times. In Multi-agent systems for traffic and
transportation engineering. Edited by: Bazzan AL, Klügl F. Hershey, PA.
Information Science Reference; 2009:57-78.
40. Vrtic M, Fröhlich P, Axhausen KW: Schweizerische Netzmodelle für
Strassen- und Schienenverkehr. In Jahrbuch 2002/2003 Schweizerische
Verkehrswirtschaft. Edited by: Bieger T, Lässer C, Maggi R. St Gallen.
Verkehrswissenschaftliche Gesellschaft; 2003:119-140.
41. Feil M, Balmer M, Axhausen KW: Generating comprehensive all-day
schedules: expanding activitiy-based travel demand modelling. European
Transport Conference Leeuwenhorst; 2009.
42. Ortúzar JdD, Willumsen LG: Modelling transport. Chichester, UK: John Wiley
& Sons;, 3 2001.
43. Bildungsstatistik Kanton Zürich. [http://www.bista.zh.ch/allg/default.aspx].
44. Mossong J, Hens N, Jit M, Beutels P, Auranen K, Mikolajczyk R, Massari M,
Salmaso S, Tomba GS, Wallinga J, Heijne J, Sadkowska-Todys M, Rosinska M,
Edmunds WJ: Social contacts and mixing patterns relevant to the spread
of infectious diseases. PLoS Med 2008, 5(3):e74.
45. Edmunds WJ, Kafatos G, Wallinga J, Mossong JR: Mixing patterns and the
spread of close-contact infectious diseases. Emerg Themes Epidemiol 2006,
3:10.
46. Smieszek T, Fiebig L, Scholz RW: Models of epidemics: when contact
repetition and clustering should be included. Theor Biol Med Model 2009,
6:11.
47. Fox JP, Cooney MK, Hall CE, Foy HM: Influenza virus infections in Seattle
families, 1975-1979. II. Pattern of infection in invaded households and
relation of age and prior antibody to occurrence of infection and
related illness. Am J Epidemiol 1982, 116:228-242.
48. Stewart JJ: Parameters of influenza aerosol transmission. Comment Theor
Biol 2002, 7:445-457.
49. Lange W, Vogel GE: Influenza: Klinik, Virologie, Epidemiologie, Therapie
und Prophylaxe. Berlin: ABW Wissenschaftsverlag; 2004.
50. Nicholson KG, Wood JM, Zambon M: Influenza. Lancet 2003, 362:1733-1745.
51. Basta NE, Halloran ME, Matrajt L, Longini IM: Estimating influenza vaccine
efficacy from challenge and community-based study data. Am J
Epidemiol 2008, 168:1343-1352.
52. Szucs TD, Müller D: Influenza vaccination coverage in five European
countries - a population-based cross-sectional analysis of two
consecutive influenza seasons. Vaccine 2005, 23:5055-5063.
53. Holm MV, Blank PR, Szucs TD: Trends in influenza vaccination coverage
rates in Germany over five seasons from 2001 to 2006. BMC Infect Dis
2007, 7:144.
54. Bundesamt für Gesundheit (BAG): Saisonale Grippe 2007/08:
Epidemiologie, Virologie, Impfstoffversorgung und -zusammensetzung.
BAG Bulletin 2008, 24/08:419-423.
55. Mathews JD, Chesson JM, McCaw JM, McVernon J: Understanding
influenza transmission, immunity and pandemic threats. Influenza Other
Respi Viruses 2009, 3:143-149.
56. Sauerbrei A, Schmidt-Ott R, Hoyer H, Wutzler P: Seroprevalence of
influenza A and B in German infants and adolescents. Med Microbiol
Immunol 2009, 198:93-101.
57. Chowell G, Miller MA, Viboud C: Seasonal influenza in the United States,
France, and Australia: transmission and prospects for control. Epidemiol
Infect 2008, 136:852-864.
58. Monto AS, Koopman JS, Longini I: Tecumseh study of illness. XIII. Influenza
infection and disease, 1976-1981. Am J Epidemiol 1985, 121:811-822.
59. Yang J, Yang F, Huang F, Wang J, Jin Q: Subclinical infection with the
novel influenza A (H1N1) virus. Clin Inf Dis 2009, 49:1622-1623.
60. Longini IM, Halloran ME, Nizam A, Yang Y: Containing pandemic influenza
with antiviral agents. Am J Epidemiol 2004, 159:623-633.
61. Germann TC, Kadau K, Longini IM, Macken CA: Mitigation strategies for
pandemic influenza in the United States. PNAS 2006, 103:5935-5940.
62. Mills CE, Robins JM, Lipsitch M: Transmissibility of 1918 pandemic
influenza. Nature 2004, 432(7019):904-906.
63. Wright PF, Ross KB, Thompson J, Karzon DT: Influenza A infections in
young children. Primary natural infection and protective efficiency of
live-vaccine-induced or naturally acquired immunity. N Engl J Med 1977,
296:829-834.
64. Carrat F, Vergu E, Ferguson NM, Lemaitre M, Cauchemez S, Leach S,
Valleron AJ: Time lines of infection and disease in human influenza: a
review of volunteer challenge studies. Am J Epidemiol 2008, 167:775-785.
65. Bjornson A, Mellencamp M, Schiff G: Complement is activated in the
upper respiratory tract during influenza virus infection. Am Rev Respir Dis
1991, 143:1062-1066.
66. Couch RB, Douglas RG, Fedson DS, Kasel JA: Correlated studies of a
recombinant influenza-virus vaccine. 3. Protection against experimental
influenza in man. J Infect Dis 1971, 124:473-480.
67. Chowell G, Ammon CE, Hengartner NW, Hyman JM: Transmission
dynamics of the great influenza pandemic of 1918 in Geneva,
Switzerland: Assessing the effects of hypothetical interventions. J Theor
Biol 2006, 241(2):193-204.
68. Eichner M, Schwehm M, Duerr HP, Brockmann SO: The influenza pandemic
preparedness planning tool InfluSim. BMC Infect Dis 2007, 7:17.
69. Anderson RM, May RM: Infectious diseases of humans: dynamics and
control. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 1991.
70. Wearing HJ, Rohani P, Keeling MJ: Appropriate models for the
management of infectious diseases. PLoS Med 2005, 2(7):e174.
71. Boivin G, Hardy I, Tellier G, Maziade J: Predicting influenza infections
during epidemics with use of a clinical case definition. Clin Inf Dis 2000,
31:1166-1169.
72. Zambon M, Hays J, Webster A, Newman R, Keene O: Diagnosis of
influenza in the community. Relationship of clinical diagnosis to
Smieszek et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2011, 11:115
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/11/115
Page 17 of 18confirmed virological, serological or molecular detection of influenza.
Arch Intern Med 2001, 161:2116-2122.
73. Monto AS, Gravenstein S, Elliott M, Colopy M, Schweinle J: Clinical signs
and symptoms prediction influenza infection. Arch Intern Med 2000,
160:3243-3247.
74. Peltola V, Reunanen T, Ziegler T, Silvennoinen H, Heikinnen T: Accuracy of
clinical diagnosis of influenza in outpatient children. Clin Inf Dis 2005,
41:1198-1200.
75. Govaert TME, Dinant GJ, Aretz K, Knottnerus JA: The predictive value of
influenza symptomatology in elderly people. Fam Pract 1998, 15:16-22.
76. Nishiura H, Chowell G, Safan M, Castillo-Chavez C: Pros and cons of
estimating the reproduction number from early epidemic growth rate of
influenza A (H1N1) 2009. Theor Biol Med Model 2010, 7:1.
77. Heikkinen T, Silvennoinen H, Peltola V, Ziegler T, Vainionpää R, Vuorinen T,
Kainulainen L, Puhakka T, Jartti T, Toikka P, Lehtinen P, Routi T, Juven T:
Burden of influenza in children in the community. J Infect Dis 2004,
190:1369-1373.
78. Glass LM, Glass RJ: Social contact networks for the spread of pandemic
influenza in children and teenagers. BMC Public Health 2008, 8:61.
79. Hens N, Ayele GM, Goeyvaerts N, Aerts M, Mossong J, Edmunds JW,
Beutels P: Estimating the impact of school closure on social mixing
behaviour and the transmission of close contact infections in eight
European countries. BMC Infect Dis 2009, 9:187.
80. Cauchemez S, Valleron AJ, Boëlle PY, Flahault A, Ferguson NM: Estimating
the impact of school closure on influenza transmission from Sentinel
data. Nature 2008, 452:750-755.
81. Heymann A, Chodick G, Reichman B, Kokia E, Laufer J: Influence of school
closure on the incidence of viral respiratory diseases among children
and on health care utilization. Pediatr Infect Dis J 2004, 23:675-677.
82. Rodriguez CV, Rietberg K, Baer A, Kwan-Gett T, Duchin J: Association
between school closure and subsequent absenteeism during a seasonal
influenza epidemic. Epidemiology 2009, 20:787-792.
83. Nelson MI, Simonsen L, Viboud C, Miller MA, Taylor J, St George K,
Griesemer SB, Ghedi E, Sengamalay NA, Spiro DJ, Volkov I, Grenfell BT,
Lipman DJ, Taubenberger JK, Holmes EC: Stochastic processes are key
determinants of short-term evolution in influenza A virus. PLoS Pathog
2006, 2:e125.
84. du Prel J-B, Puppe W, Gröndahl B, Knuf M, Weigl JAI, Schaaff F, Schmitt HJ:
Are meteorological parameters associated with acute respiratory tract
infections? Clin Inf Dis 2009, 49:861-868.
85. Zhou SZ: A seasonal influenza theory and mathematical model
incorporating meteorological and socio-behavioral factors. J Trop
Meteorol 2009, 15(1):1-12.
86. Monto AS, Sullivan KM: Acute respiratory illness in the community.
Frequency of illness and the agents involved. Epidemiol Infect 1993,
110:145-160.
87. Fox JP, Hall CE, Cooney MK, Foy HM: Influenza virus infections in Seattle
families, 1975-1979. I. Study design, methods and the occurrence of
infections by time and age. Am J Epidemiol 1982, 116:212-227.
88. Bell DC, Atkinson JS, Carlson JW: Centrality measures for disease
transmission networks. Soc Networks 1999, 21:1-21.
89. Bansal S, Grenfell BT, Meyers LA: When individual behaviour matters:
homogeneous and network models in epidemiology. J R Soc Interface
2007, 4:879-891.
90. Schlich R, Axhausen KW: Habitual travel behaviour: evidence from a six-
week travel diary. Transportation 2003, 30:13-36.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/11/115/prepub
doi:10.1186/1471-2334-11-115
Cite this article as: Smieszek et al.: Reconstructing the 2003/2004 H3N2
influenza epidemic in Switzerland with a spatially explicit, individual-
based model. BMC Infectious Diseases 2011 11:115.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Smieszek et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2011, 11:115
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/11/115
Page 18 of 18